The Irreparably Harmed Presumption? Why the Presumption of Irreparable Harm in Trademark Law Will Survive eBay and Winter by Sanchez, Jeffrey M.
BYU Law Review
Volume 2011 | Issue 2 Article 6
5-1-2011
The Irreparably Harmed Presumption? Why the
Presumption of Irreparable Harm in Trademark
Law Will Survive eBay and Winter
Jeffrey M. Sanchez
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Commercial Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jeffrey M. Sanchez, The Irreparably Harmed Presumption? Why the Presumption of Irreparable Harm in Trademark Law Will Survive eBay
and Winter, 2011 BYU L. Rev. 535 (2011).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2011/iss2/6
DO NOT DELETE 5/3/2011 1:41 PM 
 
535 
The Irreparably Harmed Presumption? Why the 
Presumption of Irreparable Harm in Trademark Law 
Will Survive eBay and Winter 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Trademarks are a unique and potentially valuable form of 
intellectual property. Unlike patents and copyrights, trademarks serve 
to indicate the source of commercial goods or services. As source 
indicators, trademarks function to both represent the acquired 
goodwill that consumers attribute to the owner of the mark and 
assure consumers of some quality of the associated goods or services. 
Because of the communicative function of trademarks, businesses 
often invest significant time, money, and energy to ensure that their 
trademarks are protected from would-be infringers. In this effort to 
protect their goodwill and reputation, businesses have traditionally 
relied on preliminary injunctive relief as “one of the most powerful 
weapons”1 against trademark infringement. Indeed, “[g]etting a 
preliminary injunction means that the trademark owner can force the 
alleged infringer to immediately stop all use of the challenged mark 
and undergo an expensive change to a significantly different mark.”2 
Thus, a preliminary injunction serves to “stop the bleeding” early on 
in litigation and can mitigate potential damage to the trademark 
owner’s reputation.  
Five basic factors guide judges in determining whether a 
preliminary injunction should issue.3 To obtain a preliminary 
injunction, a trademark owner must demonstrate 
 
1. that it is likely to succeed upon an ultimate trial on the 
merits, 
2. that it has suffered an irreparable injury, 
3. that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, 
are inadequate to compensate for the injury, 
 
 1. J. Thomas McCarthy, Are Preliminary Injunctions Against Trademark Infringement 
Getting Harder to Achieve?, 14 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 1 (2009). 
 2. Id. (emphasis added). 
 3. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION §§ 30:30–30:32 (4th ed. 2010). 
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4. that, considering the balance of hardships between the 
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted, 
and  
5. that the public interest would not be disserved by a 
preliminary injunction.4 
 
Traditionally, trademark owners seeking a preliminary injunction 
have almost uniformly enjoyed a presumption of irreparable harm 
upon establishing a likelihood of success on the merits.5 The Third 
Circuit has even gone so far as to say, “once the likelihood of 
confusion caused by trademark infringement has been established, 
the inescapable conclusion is that there was also irreparable injury.”6 
However, two recent Supreme Court cases, eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C.7 and Winter v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.,8 have called into question whether the presumption of 
irreparable harm is still valid in the trademark context.9 In eBay, the 
Supreme Court held invalid the Federal Circuit’s “general rule” that 
plaintiffs in patent disputes are automatically entitled to a permanent 
injunction once validity and infringement are determined.10 In doing 
so, the Court reaffirmed the requirement for courts to “apply the 
 
 4.   See McCarthy, supra note 1, at 2–3; eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 
388, 391 (2006). These five factors derive from the traditional four-factor permanent 
injunction test endorsed by the Supreme Court in eBay and will be referred to throughout this 
Note. The additional requirement, that the trademark owner demonstrate a likelihood of 
success on the merits, exists only in the preliminary injunction context. 
 5. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 30:47; see, e.g., Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 
315 F.3d 264, 273 (4th Cir. 2002) (“In Lanham Act cases involving trademark infringement, 
a presumption of irreparable injury is generally applied once the plaintiff has demonstrated a 
likelihood of confusion, the key element in an infringement case.”); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural 
Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 469 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Irreparable harm is generally presumed in 
cases of trademark infringement and dilution.”); Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 
124 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1997) (“In the context of trademark and unfair competition 
injunctions, the requirement of irreparable harm carries no independent weight, as we have 
held that a showing of likelihood of confusion (a requirement of both trademark infringement 
and unfair competition claims) establishes irreparable harm.”). 
 6. Pappan Enters., Inc. v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d 800, 805 (3d Cir. 
1998).   
 7. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).  
 8. 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). 
 9. See generally McCarthy, supra note 1; Thomas M. Williams, Winter v. NRDC: A 
Stricter Standard for Irreparable Harm in Trademark Cases?, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 571 (2009). 
 10. eBay, 547 U.S. at 394. 
DO NOT DELETE 5/3/2011 1:41 PM 
535 The Irreparably Harmed Presumption? 
 537 
traditional four factor test for injunctive relief in every case.”11 
Similarly, in Winter, the Supreme Court overruled the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding that, once a plaintiff has demonstrated a strong 
likelihood of success on the merits, “a preliminary injunction may be 
entered based only on a ‘possibility’ of irreparable harm.”12 Like in 
eBay, the Court in Winter rejected the notion of a lower standard of 
irreparable harm; however, unlike in eBay, it did so in the 
preliminary injunction context.  
The Supreme Court’s decisions in eBay and Winter have 
prompted courts to question the continuing validity of the 
presumption of irreparable harm in the trademark context.13 
Accordingly, some courts have held that Supreme Court precedent 
has eviscerated the presumption of irreparable harm,14 while others 
have held that the presumption is alive and well.15 This split in 
authority has prompted some commentators to set forth arguments 
both for and against the presumption’s survival. However, as of this 
writing, there has been limited scholarly analysis discussing the 
presumption’s continuing validity in light of both eBay and Winter. 
Further, there has been no legal scholarship discussing, in-depth, 
Winter’s impact on the trademark presumption. This Note 
summarizes the leading arguments regarding the presumption’s 
continuing validity and seeks to advance the discussion by (1) using 
the most recent case law to identify and analyze the differing 
approaches taken by courts on the subject, (2) expanding on the 
differences between the trademark presumption of irreparable harm 
and the categorical rule struck down in eBay, and (3) demonstrating 
that Winter may peacefully co-exist with the presumption.  
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II analyzes the holdings of 
eBay and Winter and illustrates the various approaches courts have 
 
 11. David H. Bernstein & Andrew Gilden, No Trolls Barred: Trademark Injunctions 
After eBay, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 1037, 1037 (2009).  
 12. Winter, 129 S. Ct at 375 (citing lower courts' citations to Faith Ctr. Church 
Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 2007); Earth Island Inst. v. 
U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1159 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
 13. See N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1228 (11th Cir. 
2008) (calling into question the post-eBay validity of the presumption of irreparable harm in 
trademark cases but declining to decide the question); Cytosport, Inc. v. Vital Pharm. Inc, 617 
F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 348 F. App’x 288 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 14. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77–78 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 15. Nationwide Payment Solutions, LLC v. Plunket, 697 F. Supp. 2d 165, 168 (D. Me. 
2010). 
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taken in applying these new precedents. Part II also briefly 
summarizes recent scholarly commentary arguing for the 
presumption’s survival post-eBay and Winter. Part III seeks to 
demonstrate that courts should continue to employ the presumption 
of irreparable harm in trademark cases because damages “[caused] by 
trademark infringement are by their very nature irreparable”16 and 
because the holdings of eBay and Winter are capable of coexisting 
with the presumption. This Note ultimately concludes that the 
presumption of irreparable harm in trademark cases should and will 
survive eBay and Winter. This Note further asserts that even if courts 
formally discard the presumption, the spirit of the presumption will 
continue to manifest itself because trademark infringement will 
almost inevitably produce irreparable harm to the trademark owner. 
Finally, Part IV offers a brief conclusion. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Courts Have Traditionally Recognized the Presumption of 
Irreparable Harm in Trademark Cases 
The traditional rule in trademark litigation is that plaintiffs 
seeking a preliminary injunction enjoy a presumption of irreparable 
harm upon showing a likelihood of success on the merits.17 The 
Seventh Circuit has gone so far as to describe the presumption as 
“well-established” in trademark cases, “even absent a showing of 
business loss.”18 The basis for this presumption has been and 
continues to be that “trademark infringement monetary relief is, in 
the language of equity, inherently ‘inadequate’ and injury is 
‘irreparable.’”19 As the Seventh Circuit has observed, “damages 
occasioned by trademark infringement are by their very nature 
irreparable and not susceptible of adequate measurement for remedy 
 
 16. Int’l Kennel Club of Chi., Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1092 (7th Cir. 
1988) (quoting Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Commc’n, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 858 (7th Cir. 
1982)). 
 17. See sources cited supra note 5; see also Fed. Express Corp. v. Fed. Espresso, Inc., 201 
F.3d 168, 174 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[P]roof of a likelihood of confusion would create a 
presumption of irreparable harm.”); GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 
1205 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 
174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[I]rreparable injury may be presumed from a showing 
of likelihood of success on the merits.”)). 
 18. Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 16 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 19. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 30:47. 
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at law.”20 One of the reasons that trademark infringement is by its 
nature irreparable is the inability of a trademark owner to “control 
the nature and quality of the defendant’s goods.”21 Accordingly, 
until the Supreme Court’s decisions in eBay and Winter, trademark 
owners almost uniformly enjoyed this presumption and could rely on 
it as a tool to protect their goodwill. 
B. eBay and Winter  
1. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 
In eBay, the Supreme Court sought to determine the 
appropriateness of the Federal Circuit’s general rule that in patent 
disputes, except in “exceptional circumstances” and “rare instances,” 
“a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity 
have been adjudged.”22 This case came to the Supreme Court after a 
jury found that eBay had infringed a business method patent owned 
by MercExchange, L.L.C.23 Despite its finding of infringement, the 
district court refused to grant a permanent injunction because 
MercExchange failed to satisfy the four-factor test for injunctive 
relief.24 In refusing the injunction, the district court concluded that 
MercExchange’s “‘willingness to license its patents’ and ‘its lack of 
commercial activity in practicing the patents’ would be sufficient to 
establish that the patent holder would not suffer irreparable harm if 
an injunction did not issue.”25 On appeal, the Federal Circuit applied 
its “general rule” and reversed the district court’s refusal to issue a 
permanent injunction.26 
On appeal from the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court held 
that both the district court and the Federal Circuit had incorrectly 
 
 20. Int’l Kennel Club, 846 F.2d at 1092 (quoting Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner 
Commc’n, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 858 (7th Cir. 1982)). 
 21. Ideal Indust., Inc. v. Gardner Bender, Inc., 612 F.2d 1018, 1026 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(quoting 4 RUDOLF CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 
88.3(b), at 205 (3d ed. 1970). 
 22. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 393–94 (2006) (quoting 
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 23. Id. at 390–91. 
 24. Id. at 393. 
 25. Id. (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D. 
Va. 2003)). 
 26. Id. at 393–94. 
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applied the test for injunctive relief.27 The Federal Circuit had erred 
by improperly applying its “general rule” instead of the traditional 
four-factor test and the district court erred by adopting a categorical 
rule that injunctions could not issue in favor of “patent trolls”28 or 
“non-practicing entities.”29 The Supreme Court essentially struck 
down the district court’s categorical rule because it could not “be 
squared with the principles of equity adopted by Congress.”30 The 
Court looked to its past treatment of injunctions under the 
Copyright Act of 1976 and applied similar reasoning for injunctions 
in the patent context.31 Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas 
reasoned that “[l]ike a patent owner, a copyright holder possesses 
‘the right to exclude others from using his property.’”32 And, “[l]ike 
the Patent Act, the Copyright Act provides that courts ‘may’ grant 
injunctive relief ‘on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent 
or restrain infringement of a copyright.’”33 Justice Thomas further 
noted that the Court had “consistently rejected invitations to replace 
traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction 
automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been 
infringed.”34 Accordingly, the Court in eBay sent a clear message that 
categorical rules were not allowed in the context of patent 
injunctions.35 While the Court’s ruling in eBay is clear, some 
commentators have suggested that “the true dispute underlying the 
case was not about the nature of equitable relief (where the Court 
 
 27. Id. at 394. 
 28. The term “patent troll” refers to “somebody who tries to make a lot of money off a 
patent that they are not practicing and have no intention of practicing and . . . [have] never 
practiced.” Overstock.com, Inc. v. Furnace Brook, LLC, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1218 (D. 
Utah 2005) (quoting Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts: Let’s Build a Pit to Catch 
the Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 367, 367 (2005)). 
 29. eBay, 547 U.S. at 393. Although the eBay opinion did not specifically use the term 
“patent troll,” the Court’s language about a patent owner’s willingness to license its patent and 
its failure to practice the patents clearly indicates that the Court is referring to patent trolls. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. at 392. 
 32. Id. (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)). 
 33. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006)). 
 34. Id. at 392–93. 
 35. Id. at 394 (“We hold only that the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive 
relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts, and that such discretion must 
be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity, in patent disputes no less than in 
other cases governed by such standards.”). 
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was unanimous), but rather about the nature of patent rights in the 
era of patent trolling.”36  
As discussed below, the Court’s analogizing of copyright law to 
patent law and its underlying concerns about patent trolling are 
important to note prior to a thoughtful discussion on how eBay will 
and should impact equitable considerations in the context of 
trademark injunctions. 
Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in eBay, the district court 
again declined, on remand, to issue a permanent injunction in favor 
of MercExchange.37 This time the district court painstakingly applied 
the four-factor test for injunctive relief and ultimately held that the 
balance of the equities favored not entering an injunction against 
eBay.38 In so holding, the district court sought to answer the 
question of “whether a presumption of irreparable harm upon a 
finding of validity and infringement survives the Supreme Court’s 
opinion [in eBay].”39 Although the eBay opinion did not specifically 
address the validity of presumptions of irreparable harm in the four-
factor injunction analysis, the district court, after reviewing relevant 
case law and the majority’s language in eBay, held that the 
presumption “no longer exists.”40 
Most courts have likewise interpreted eBay as eliminating the 
presumption of irreparable harm in the patent context.41 And 
although eBay does not specify whether its holding applies to forms 
of intellectual property other than patents and copyrights, some 
courts have read eBay as eliminating the presumption of irreparable 
harm in the context of preliminary injunctions in trademark law.42 
 
 36. Bernstein & Gilden, supra note 11, at 1043 (citing Michael W. Carroll, Patent 
Injunctions and the Problems of Uniformity Cost, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 421, 
426 (2007)).  
 37. See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 591–92 (E.D. Va. 
2007). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 568. 
 40. Id.  
 41. See, e.g., MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d 958, 974 (D. 
Ariz. 2009) (“After eBay . . . the presumption of irreparable harm no longer inures to the 
benefit of plaintiffs.”); Voilé Mfg. Corp. v. Dandurand, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1306 (D. Utah 
2008) (“[T]he majority of district courts to directly analyze the issue have held that eBay did 
away with the presumption of irreparable harm in preliminary injunction cases involving 
patents.”). 
 42. See, e.g., Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi, No. CV-05-2656-PHX-MHM, 2010 
WL 1743189, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010); IMX, Inc. v. Lending Tree, LLC, 469 F. Supp. 
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Other courts have refused to apply eBay when deciding whether to 
recognize a presumption of irreparable harm against an accused 
trademark infringer.43 In fact, one district court held that eBay was 
“confined to permanent injunctions issued under the Patent Act” 
and that plaintiffs are still entitled to a presumption of irreparable 
harm upon a showing of a likelihood of success on the merits.44 
Such a split in authority evidences the need for further Supreme 
Court guidance on the issue. While eBay clarified the impropriety of 
applying categorical rules in place of a thorough analysis of the four-
factor injunction test, it left open questions such as whether the 
decision applied to preliminary injunctions, whether the decision 
prohibits rebuttable presumptions favoring injunctions, and whether 
the decision applies in the trademark injunction context.45 While the 
Supreme Court has yet to directly address these questions, the 
Court’s recent decision in Winter sheds some additional light on the 
inquiry.46 
2. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 
Winter involved a claim by Natural Resources Defense Council 
(“NRDC”), an environmental protection organization, against the 
United States Navy for its use of mid-frequency active (“MFA”) 
sonar in training exercises.47 NRDC claimed that the Navy’s use of 
MFA was causing serious injury to several species of marine 
mammals and was thus in violation of the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”) and other federal laws.48 After filing 
suit, NRDC sought declaratory judgment and a preliminary 
injunction against the Navy’s use of MFAs.49 The district court 
entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Navy from using 
MFA sonar during its training exercises because, pursuant to Ninth 
 
2d 203, 224 (D. Del. 2007); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. 
Supp. 2d 1197, 1211 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
 43. See Nationwide Payment Solutions, LLC v. Plunket, 697 F. Supp. 2d 165, 168 (D. 
Me. 2010). 
 44. Operation Able of Greater Boston, Inc. v. Nat. Able Network, Inc. 646 F. Supp. 2d 
166, 176–77 (D. Mass. 2009). 
 45.  See Bernstein & Gilden, supra note 11, at 1043. 
 46. 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). 
 47. Id. at 371. 
 48. Id. at 372. 
 49. Id.  
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Circuit precedent, NRDC had established “at least a ‘possibility’ of 
irreparable harm to the environment.”50 On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit ultimately upheld the district court’s ruling based, in part, 
upon NRDC having met its burden of establishing a “possibility” of 
irreparable injury.51 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision, and vacated the preliminary 
injunction.52 The Supreme Court took issue with the Ninth Circuit’s 
standard that “when a plaintiff demonstrates a strong likelihood of 
prevailing on the merits, a preliminary injunction may be entered 
based only on a ‘possibility’ of irreparable harm.”53 Citing some of its 
previous decisions,54 the Court held that the Ninth Circuit’s 
“possibility” standard was “too lenient” and expressly overruled it.55 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, stated that “[i]ssuing a 
preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm 
is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an 
extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear 
showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”56 The Court set 
forth the correct standard for judging irreparable harm: “Our 
frequently reiterated standard requires plaintiffs seeking preliminary 
relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of 
an injunction.”57 The Court went on to note the importance of the 
NRDC’s “ecological, scientific, and recreational interests in marine 
mammals,”58 but ultimately concluded that these interests were 
“outweighed by the Navy’s need to conduct realistic training 
exercises to ensure that it is able to neutralize the threat posed by 
enemy submarines.”59 
 
 50. Id. at 372–73. 
 51. Id. at 373–74. 
 52. Id. at 374. 
 53. Id. at 375. 
 54. Id. at 375 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983); Granny 
Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70, 415 
U.S. 423, 441 (1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)). 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at 375–76 (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per 
curiam)). 
 57. Id. at 375. 
 58. Id. at 382. 
 59. Id. 
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As with eBay, the holding of Winter has had reverberations in 
trademark cases. Although Winter did not involve trademark 
infringement or intellectual property rights, several courts have cited 
to Winter in holding that a presumption of irreparable harm is no 
longer valid in the trademark injunction context.60 For example, a 
judge in the Eastern District of California recently issued a 
preliminary injunction against an alleged infringer after finding, on 
the merits, that the defendant’s products were likely to cause 
confusion with respect to the plaintiff’s trademark and trade dress.61 
Noting the pre-Winter validity of a presumption of irreparable harm, 
the court held that after Winter a plaintiff is no longer entitled to 
such a presumption when seeking a preliminary injunction in a 
trademark case.62 In contrast, some courts have taken the opposite 
approach to their application of Winter, holding that the 
presumption is alive and well.63 
Unlike eBay, Winter did not involve an explicit presumption of 
irreparable harm. However, like in eBay, the Winter Court sent a 
strong message that an injunction test that minimized the 
importance of demonstrating irreparable harm did not square with 
notion of injunctive relief as an extraordinary equitable remedy. But, 
as discussed below, both the eBay and Winter decisions were heavily 
influenced by the policy considerations of the underlying factual 
circumstances. eBay was decided in light of the recent increase in 
patent troll activity and the debate concerning the property nature of 
patents, while the Winter decision had significant implications for 
national security. Understanding that these policy considerations 
weighed heavily in the Supreme Court’s decisions is key to 
predicting how the Court might rule in future cases implicating the 
presumption of irreparable harm in trademark cases. It is also 
important to note that patent infringement and MFA sonar use do 
 
 60. See, e.g., Cytosport, Inc. v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (E.D. Cal. 
2009), aff’d, 348 F. App’x 288 (9th Cir. 2009); Volkswagen AG v. Verdier Microbus & 
Camper, Inc., No. C 09-00231 JSW, 2009 WL 928130, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009); 
Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc. v. Quintana, 654 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2009); 
Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Brosnan, No. C 09-3600 SBA, 2009 WL 3647125, 
at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2009). 
 61. Cytosport, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 1051. 
 62. Id. at 1065. 
 63. See, e.g., Garcoa, Inc. v. PH Beauty Labs, Inc., No. CV 09-4859 AHM, 2009 WL 
2489223, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2009). 
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not by their nature cause irreparable harm, as is generally the case 
with trademark infringement.64 
C. Recent Court Approaches to the Presumption of Irreparable Harm 
As mentioned above, in the wake of the eBay and Winter 
decisions, courts have taken different approaches to the traditionally 
recognized presumption of irreparable harm in trademark cases. The 
remainder of this Section presents the three main approaches taken 
by courts in applying eBay and Winter in cases where a trademark 
owner sought preliminary injunctive relief. These approaches include 
(1) holding that the presumption is no longer valid,65 (2) holding 
that the presumption survives in the trademark context,66 and (3) 
side-stepping the issue because of uncertainty regarding whether the 
presumption is still valid.67 
1. The presumption is no longer valid 
An opinion recently handed down by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit illustrates the view that the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in eBay and Winter have done away with the 
presumption of irreparable harm.68 Although Salinger v. Colting is a 
copyright case, the language in the court’s opinion implicates 
injunctions in any context.69 In Salinger, J.D. Salinger brought a 
copyright infringement suit against an author for allegedly copying 
scenes, characters, events, and other elements from Salinger’s classic 
novel Catcher in the Rye.70 Upon establishing a prima facie case of 
copyright infringement, Salinger moved the district court to 
 
 64. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 30:47. 
 65. See supra notes 42 and 60 and accompanying text. 
 66. See supra notes 44 and 63 and accompanying text. 
 67. See N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1228 (11th Cir. 
2008) (declining to decide whether the presumption of irreparable harm in trademark 
injunction cases survived the Court’s holding in eBay); Fiji Water Co. v. Fiji Mineral Water 
USA, LLC, No. SACV09-1148 CJC MLGx, 2010 WL 3835673, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 
2010) (holding that Winter “casts some doubt as to whether [the] presumption, alone, is 
sufficient”). 
 68. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77–78 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 69. Id. at 78 & n.7 (“[A]lthough our holding here is limited to preliminary injunctions 
in the context of copyright cases, eBay’s central lesson is that . . . a court deciding whether to 
issue an injunction must not adopt ‘categorical’ or ‘general’ rules or presume that a party has 
met an element of the injunction standard.”). 
 70. Id. at 72. 
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preliminarily enjoin the author from essentially all future commercial 
activity surrounding the promotion of the allegedly infringing 
book.71 Holding that eBay applied only in the patent context, the 
district court presumed irreparable harm and issued a preliminary 
injunction.72 On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the injunction 
and remanded the case.73 In doing so, the court not only held that 
eBay applies in the copyright context but also that it eviscerated the 
presumption of irreparable harm upon a showing of a likelihood of 
success on the merits in copyright cases.74 While noting that its 
holding was limited to preliminary injunctions in the copyright 
context, the court opined in dictum that it saw “no reason that eBay 
would not apply with equal force to an injunction in any type of 
case.”75 The court then bolstered its holding by citing to Winter for 
the propositions that eBay does not “permit an easier grant of a 
preliminary injunction than of a permanent injunction”76 and that 
courts must not presume irreparable harm.77  
Salinger represents the Second Circuit’s post-eBay and post-
Winter rejection of the presumption of irreparable harm in copyright 
cases.78 The First, Eleventh, and Fourth Circuits have also rejected 
the presumption in the copyright context.79 This approach is the 
majority rule in patent cases as well.80 There is, however, less of a 
consensus in trademark cases. Although two circuit courts have 
expressed doubt as to the survival of the presumption in trademark 
cases,81 no circuit has explicitly concluded that the presumption of 
irreparable harm is dead in the trademark context. Nonetheless, 
various district courts have taken this step.82 In Cytosport, Inc. v. 
Vital Pharmaceuticals, the District Court for the Eastern District of 
California held that “the governing law has changed in light of 
 
 71. Id. at 73. 
 72. Id. at 73–74. 
 73. Id. at 76. 
 74. Id. at 80. 
 75. Id. at 78 n.7. 
 76. Id. at 78. 
 77. Id. at 80. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 77 n.6. 
 80. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 81. See Paulsson Geophysical Serv., Inc. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 313 (5th Cir. 2008); 
N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1228 (11th Cir. 2008).  
 82. See supra notes 42 and 60 and accompanying text. 
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Winter”83 and that a plaintiff is no longer granted the presumption 
of irreparable harm upon a showing of likelihood of success on the 
merits.84 However, it is important to note that, despite not applying 
the presumption, the court found sufficient evidence of irreparable 
harm to merit a preliminary injunction.85  
The Ninth Circuit, in a non-precedential memorandum opinion, 
later affirmed this decision, holding that “the district court did not 
rely on an erroneous legal premise or abuse its discretion in 
concluding that Cytosport was likely to succeed on the merits and 
showed a strong likelihood that it would suffer irreparable harm if 
the preliminary injunction did not issue.”86 However, the Ninth 
Circuit panel made no specific mention of the lower court’s non-
application of the presumption of irreparable harm.  
Holdings similar to that in Cytosport can be found in opinions 
from the District of Arizona87 and the Central District of 
California.88 Additionally, three separate opinions out of the 
Northern District of California have expressly rejected the trademark 
presumption of irreparable harm.89 In one of those cases, Volkswagen 
AG v. Verdier Microbus & Camper, Inc.,90 Volkswagen sought a 
preliminary injunction against Verdier for allegedly designing and 
selling automobiles “to appear as if they were manufactured by, 
sponsored by, or affiliated with [Volkswagen].”91 In that case, the 
court noted the traditional application of the presumption of 
irreparable harm but held that a plaintiff is no longer granted the 
 
 83. 617 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 348 F. App’x 288 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 1081. 
 86. Cytosport, Inc. v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 348 F. App’x 288, 289 (9th Cir. 2009) (not 
precedential). 
 87. See Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi, No. CV-05-2656-PHX-MHM, 2010 WL 
1743189, at *2 (D. Ariz. April 29, 2010) (“The Court finds this reasoning [of other courts 
not recognizing the presumption] sound and will likewise decline to apply the presumption of 
irreparable harm.”). 
 88. See Aurora World, Inc. v. Ty Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1167–69 (C.D. Cal. 
2009) (holding that eBay applies in the trademark context to eliminate the presumption of 
irreparable harm). 
 89. See Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Brosnan, No. C 09-3600 SBA, 2009 WL 
3647125, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2009); Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc. v. Quintana, 654 
F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Volkswagen AG v. Verdier Microbus & Camper, 
Inc., No. C 09-00231 JSW, 2009 WL 928130, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009).  
 90. No. C 09-00231 JSW, 2009 WL 928130. 
 91. Id. at *1. 
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presumption of irreparable harm upon a showing of likelihood of 
success on the merits.92 As in Cytosport, the Volkswagen court held 
that Volkswagen had met its burden of demonstrating irreparable 
harm despite concluding that the presumption of irreparable harm is 
no longer valid.93  
Ironically, in so holding, the court “articulated the 
underpinnings of the presumption it held null-and-void.”94 “The 
reason for the trademark presumption of irreparable injury is that 
once a probability of proving likelihood of confusion at trial is 
shown, the trademark owner’s business goodwill and reputation are 
at risk.”95 While the Volkswagen court employed this reasoning in 
finding that irreparable harm was likely, many courts have used this, 
and other reasoning, as justification for presuming irreparable harm 
post-eBay and post-Winter. This approach is illustrated below. 
2. The presumption survives in the trademark context 
Despite the growing consensus that the presumption of 
irreparable harm is dead in the patent and copyright contexts, many 
courts continue to recognize the presumption in trademark cases. 
Shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay, the Sixth Circuit 
maintained, in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Amouri’s Grand Foods, Inc., 
its traditional practice of presuming irreparable harm “when a 
likelihood of confusion or possible risk to reputation appears from 
infringement or unfair competition.”96 Because Lorillard was 
decided less than two months after eBay, it is possible that the Sixth 
Circuit was not sufficiently guided by eBay in upholding the 
presumption. However, in Ignition Athletic Performance Group, LLC 
v. Hantz Soccer U.S.A., the Sixth Circuit again applied the trademark 
presumption of irreparable harm, this time with ample time to 
consider eBay’s reach in the trademark injunction context.97 In a 
 
 92. Id. at *2. 
 93. Id. at *6. 
 94. Williams, supra note 9, at 574. 
 95. Volkswagen, No. C 09-00231 JSW, 2009 WL 928130, at *6 (quoting 4 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30:47 (4th ed. 
2010)). 
 96. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Amouri’s Grand Foods, Inc., 453 F.3d 377, 382 (6th Cir. 
2006) (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. CarMax, Inc., 165 F.3d 1047, 1056 (6th Cir. 
1999)). 
 97. Ignition Athletic Performance Grp., LLC v. Hantz Soccer U.S.A., 245 Fed. App’x 
456, 460 (6th. Cir. 2007). 
DO NOT DELETE 5/3/2011 1:41 PM 
535 The Irreparably Harmed Presumption? 
 549 
more recent case, a district court in the Sixth Circuit also recognized 
the post-eBay validity of the trademark presumption and suggested 
that eBay might be limited to the context of permanent injunctive 
relief.98 
While courts in the Sixth Circuit continue to recognize the 
trademark presumption, the Ninth Circuit’s position on the issue is 
unclear. As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit, in a non-precedential 
decision, affirmed a decision in which the lower court held that the 
presumption of irreparable harm was no longer recognized post-
Winter.99 However, in Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma 
GmbH & Co., a Ninth Circuit panel affirmed a preliminary 
injunction in which the lower court presumed irreparable injury 
following a finding of a likelihood of success on the merits.100 But 
unlike in Cytosport, the Marlyn court expressly addressed the 
presumption of irreparable harm, holding it valid.101 These two cases 
are the only instances in which the Ninth Circuit was presented with 
the issue of whether the trademark presumption survived eBay. 
Unfortunately these cases shed very little light on the current validity 
of the presumption in the Ninth Circuit.  
This lack of guidance has produced mixed results from district 
courts within the Ninth Circuit. As discussed above, courts in the 
Eastern and Northern Districts of California have held that Winter 
effectively eliminated the trademark presumption of irreparable 
harm.102 However, various other courts within the Ninth Circuit 
have reached the opposite conclusion. For example, in Morocanoil, 
Inc. v. Moroccan Gold, LLC, the District Court for the Central 
District of California applied, in a trademark case, the Winter 
standard for preliminary injunctions, which requires a plaintiff to 
“demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an 
 
 98. Innovation Ventures, LLC v. Body Dynamics, Inc., No. 08-12711, 2009 WL 
877640, at *3 (E.D. Mich. March 30, 2009). 
 99. See Cytosport, Inc. v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 348 Fed. App’x 288, 289 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 100. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 877 
(9th Cir. 2009). 
 101. Id.  
 102. See Cytosport, Inc. v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 
2009), aff’d, 348 F. App’x 288 (9th Cir. 2009); Volkswagen AG v. Verdier Microbus & 
Camper, Inc., No. C 09-00231 JSW, 2009 WL 928130 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009). 
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injunction.”103 However, the court also recognized and applied the 
presumption of irreparable harm after the plaintiff established a 
likelihood of confusion.104  
Less than a year after the Morocanoil decision, another court in 
the Central District of California reached a similar conclusion.105 In 
that case, the court acknowledged Winter as overruling the Ninth 
Circuit’s lower standard of irreparable harm but nonetheless held 
that courts may continue to presume irreparable harm “because 
trademark damages are, by their very nature, irreparable.”106 In a 
footnote, the court cited to Marlyn for the Ninth Circuit’s post-eBay 
recognition of the survival of the trademark presumption of 
irreparable harm.107 The court stated, “although the Supreme 
Court’s decision in eBay has cast some doubt on to the continued 
viability of the presumption of irreparable harm in trademark cases, 
this Court will apply current Ninth Circuit law.”108  
Similar holdings can be found in other district court cases within 
the Ninth Circuit.109 In a recent trademark and copyright 
infringement case, the District Court for the Northern District of 
California specifically recognized trademark infringement claims as 
the only type of case where irreparable harm may be presumed.110 
Thus, because the Ninth Circuit has yet to expressly address the 
continuing viability of the trademark presumption, courts within that 
circuit are split on the issue and have cited to Ninth Circuit 
precedent in reaching opposite conclusions.  
The survival of the trademark presumption of irreparable harm 
has also been recognized by various district courts outside of the 
 
 103. Morocanoil, Inc. v. Moroccan Gold, LLC, 590 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1281 (C.D. Cal. 
2008) (quoting Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 375 
(2008)). 
 104. Id. at 1281. 
 105. Garcoa, Inc. v. PH Beauty Labs., Inc., No. CV 09-4859 AHM (Ex), 2009 WL 
2489223, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2009). 
 106. Id. (citing Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 
1066 (9th Cir.1999)).  
 107. Id. at *2 n.3. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Sky Capital Group, LLC v. Rojas, No. 1:09-CV-00083-EJL, 2009 WL 
1370938, at *11–12 (D. Idaho May 14, 2009); Falcon Stainless, Inc. v. Rino Co., No. SA CV 
08-926 AHS (MLGx), 2008 WL 5179037, at *4, *9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2008). 
 110. Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“Other 
than for trademark infringement claims, there is no presumption of irreparable harm with 
respect to a permanent injunction.”). 
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Sixth and Ninth Circuits.111 Recently, the District Court for the 
Western District of North Carolina suggested that some have 
overestimated eBay’s reach into trademark law.112 In Irwin Industrial 
Tool Co. v. Worthington Cylinders Wisconsin, LLC, the court held 
that eBay merely rejected the notion that an injunction should follow 
a determination of a patent or copyright infringement, and should 
not be read to eliminate the presumption of irreparable harm in 
trademark cases.113 The court concluded, “eBay does not discuss, 
much less eliminate, the presumption of irreparable harm in this 
[trademark] context.”114  
3. Evaluating irreparable harm without relying on the presumption 
Although many courts continue to take a definitive stance on the 
trademark presumption by either flatly rejecting it or fully 
recognizing it, some courts remain unwilling to make such clear-cut 
conclusions. Accordingly, those courts have side-stepped the issue by 
evaluating irreparable harm without employing the presumption. 
These courts seem reluctant to decide this complicated issue when 
the nature of trademark damages lends itself to a high likelihood of 
establishing irreparable harm upon preliminary findings of 
infringement.115  
In 2008, the Eleventh Circuit, in North American Medical Corp. 
v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., became the first federal circuit court to 
question the validity of the trademark presumption following the 
Supreme Court’s decision in eBay.116 In that case, the court 
recognized eBay’s applicability to the trademark case at hand but 
expressly declined to decide “whether the district court was correct 
in its holding that the nature of trademark infringement gives rise to 
 
 111. See, e.g., Nationwide Payment Solutions, LLC v. Plunkett, 697 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D. 
Me. 2010); New York City Triathlon, LLC v. NYC Triathlon Club, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 2d 305 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); Toytrackerz LLC v. Koehler, No. 08-2297-GLR, 2009 WL 2591329 (D. 
Kan. Aug. 21, 2009); Gold's Gym Licensing, LLC v. K-Pro Mktg. Grp., Inc., No. 09-CV-
1211 (PJS/RLE), 2009 WL 2253247 (D. Minn. July 28, 2009); Miyano Mach. USA, Inc. v. 
MiyanoHitec Mach., Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 868 (N.D. Ill. 2008).  
 112. Irwin Indus. Tool Co., v. Worthington Cylinders Wis., LLC, Civil No. 3:08cv291, 
2010 WL 3895698, at *8 n.4 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 2010). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
 116. 522 F.3d 1211, 1228 (11th Cir. 2008).  
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a presumption of irreparable injury.”117 More specifically, the court 
declined to answer “whether such a presumption is the equivalent of 
the categorical rules rejected by the Court in eBay.”118 As a result, 
the Eleventh Circuit panel vacated the preliminary injunction 
granted by the lower court and remanded the case for proceedings 
not inconsistent with the court’s opinion or with eBay.119 In doing 
so, the court expressly acknowledged that the district court, on 
remand, might decide the issue without employing the presumption, 
or that it might “decide that the particular circumstances of the 
instant case bear substantial parallels to previous cases such that a 
presumption of irreparable injury is an appropriate exercise of its 
discretion in light of the historical traditions.”120 
Shortly after North American Medical, the Fifth Circuit decided 
a trademark infringement appeal without answering the “difficult 
question” of whether eBay did away with the presumption of 
irreparable harm.121 Instead, the court side-stepped the issue by 
addressing the irreparable harm inquiry without applying the 
presumption.122 The court found that the plaintiff had demonstrated 
a substantial threat of irreparable injury to its goodwill and to the 
value of its mark.123 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit panel upheld the 
preliminary injunction.124  
This “side-stepping” of the presumption of irreparable harm has 
become quite popular in the wake of eBay and Winter. Instead of 
deciding the issue of the presumption’s continued validity, these 
courts have granted preliminary injunctions based on a finding that 
probable damage to a plaintiff’s goodwill and reputation is direct 
evidence of irreparable injury.125  
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Paulsson Geophysical Serv., Inc. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 313 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Fiji Water Co., LLC v. Fiji Mineral Water USA, LLC, No. SACV09-1148 CJC 
MLGx, 2010 WL 3835673, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2010) (“Regardless of whether the 
presumption applies, FIJI has shown that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary 
injunction is not issued in this case.”); Sound Surgical Techs., LLC v. Leonard A. Rubinstein, 
M.D., P.A., No. 8:10-CV-970-T-27MAP, 2010 WL 3199893, at *11 (M.D. Fla., Aug. 12, 
2010)(“[E]ven if Plaintiff is not entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm, the Court finds 
that Plaintiff has shown a substantial threat of consumer confusion and resulting irreparable 
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For example, in Petro Franchise Systems, LLC v. All American 
Properties, Inc.,126 a court in the Western District of Texas held that a 
trademark owner “established irreparable harm whether that harm is 
presumed or must be established.”127 In so holding, the court 
suggested its doubt as to whether eBay eliminated the presumption 
of irreparable harm and concluded that irreparable harm could 
“easily be found in this case.”128  
A similar example can be found in a case out of the Middle 
District of Alabama. In Auburn University v. Moody, the court noted 
the Eleventh Circuit’s recognition of the presumption but opted to 
avoid the eBay issue by evaluating irreparable harm without relying 
on the presumption.129 Again, in that case, the court found 
irreparable harm because not enjoining the allegedly infringing 
activity would have caused the trademark owner to lose control of its 
reputation and caused dilution and weakening of its associated 
brand.130  
This approach of side-stepping allows courts to decide cases 
amidst the uncertainty resulting from eBay and Winter. While not 
expressly deciding whether the presumption is still valid, courts 
continue to recognize the underpinnings of the presumption in 
evaluating irreparable harm. This approach also demonstrates the 
survival of the spirit of the presumption following eBay and Winter.  
 
harm to its reputation and the goodwill represented by its marks.”) Nike, Inc. v. Austin, No. 
6:09-cv-796-Orl-28KRS, 2009 WL 3535500, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2009) (finding 
irreparable harm without reliance on the presumption because Nike’s goodwill among the 
consuming public would be undermined if defendants were not prohibited from selling 
merchandise bearing Nike’s marks); Marv-a-Les Air Charters, LLC v. Sea Tow Serv. Int’l, Inc., 
No. CV406-148, 2009 WL 2988903, at *3 n.7 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 2009) (not applying the 
presumption because it was not necessary to establish irreparable harm in that case); Chanel, 
Inc. v. Mesadieu, No. 6:08-cv-1557-Orl-31KRS, 2009 WL 2496586, at *8 (M.D. Fla., Aug. 
12, 2009) (finding irreparable harm without reliance on the presumption because “Chanel has 
developed goodwill among the consuming public which would be undermined if Mesadieu is 
not prohibited from selling merchandise bearing Chanel’s marks”); Grooms v. Legge, No. 
09cv489-IEG-POR, 2009 WL 962067, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2009) (“Even without this 
presumption, plaintiffs have demonstrated the threat of irreparable harm.”). 
 126. 607 F. Supp. 2d 781 (W.D. Tex. 2009). 
 127. Id. at 793–94. 
 128. Id. at 794. 
 129. No. 3:08cv796-CSC, 2008 WL 4877542 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 4, 2008). 
 130. Id. at *8–9. 
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D. Recent Commentary Regarding the Presumption of Irreparable 
Harm  
As is the case with the courts, scholars are likewise divided as to 
the trademark presumption’s continuing validity.131 Among the most 
notable scholars advocating the presumption’s survival is Professor J. 
Thomas McCarthy. Both in his treatise on trademark law132 and in a 
recent article,133 Professor McCarthy offers a brief analysis of why he 
thinks eBay should not be read to eliminate the presumption. He 
argues that, because the presumption is rebuttable, it is not 
inconsistent with the underlying policy of the eBay decision.134 He 
also argues that the inherently irreparable nature of trademark 
infringement distinguishes trademark cases from the patent and 
copyright situations mentioned in eBay.135 Professor McCarthy has 
yet to offer an in-depth discussion on these points. However, in a 
recently published article, No Trolls Barred: Trademark Injunctions 
After eBay, trademark attorneys David H. Bernstein and Andrew 
Gilden attempt to flesh out McCarthy’s argument.136 They do so by 
expanding on the differences in the rationales underlying the various 
forms of intellectual property and explaining how such differences 
implicate differing policy concerns.137 Accordingly, Bernstein and 
Gilden conclude that “eBay should not extend ipso facto to 
trademark infringements from the mere fact that trademarks are 
broadly categorized as being ‘intellectual property.’”138  
The following Part attempts to advance the scholarly discussion 
by (1) expanding on the differences between the trademark 
presumption of irreparable harm and the categorical rule struck 
down by the Court in eBay and (2) demonstrating that Winter may 
peacefully co-exist with the presumption’s survival.  
 
 131. Compare MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 30:47 (arguing for the presumption’s 
survival), with Sandra Rierson, IP Remedies After eBay: Assessing the Impact on Trademark 
Law, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 163, 166 (2008) (arguing against the presumption’s 
survival). 
 132. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3. 
 133. McCarthy, supra note 1, at 1. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Bernstein & Gilden, supra note 11, at 1037. 
 137. Id. at 1038–39. 
 138. Id. at 1060. 
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III. THE PRESUMPTION OF IRREPARABLE HARM IN TRADEMARK 
CASES SHOULD AND WILL SURVIVE EBAY AND WINTER 
As described above, following the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
eBay and Winter, courts have either rejected, recognized, or side-
stepped the presumption of irreparable harm in trademark cases. It 
remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will grant certiorari 
to clarify the law in this area. Accordingly, courts and commentators 
are left to debate which position will ultimately win out. This Part 
argues that the presumption will survive because the holdings of eBay 
and Winter are capable of coexisting with the presumption, and 
because damages caused by trademark infringement are by their very 
nature irreparable. The following three subsections further illustrate 
this position.  
A. eBay Did Not Kill the Presumption of Irreparable Harm in 
Trademark Cases 
As described in Part I, the Supreme Court in eBay struck down 
the Federal Circuit’s general rule that a permanent injunction will 
automatically issue following a finding of patent validity and 
infringement. This holding should not be read to eliminate the 
presumption of irreparable harm in trademark cases. This position is 
supported by several arguments. 
First, presuming irreparable harm upon a showing of a likelihood 
of trademark infringement does not equate with the “categorical”139 
rule struck down by the Court in eBay. The central holding of eBay 
was to invalidate a test that departed from the equitable 
considerations traditionally weighed by courts in determining 
whether an injunction should issue.140 The eBay opinion certainly 
suggests the Supreme Court’s intolerance for circumventing a 
thorough application of the traditional four-factor injunction 
analysis.  
However, the presumption of irreparable harm in trademark 
infringement cases does not undermine this test. Presuming 
irreparable harm in trademark cases does not preclude a thorough 
analysis of the traditional four-factor test for injunctive relief. Nor 
does it constitute “a major departure from the long tradition of 
 
 139. See eBay v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2005). 
 140. Id. 
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equity practice” that the Court sought to protect in eBay.141 A 
presumption is not a categorical rule. It is “a legal inference or 
assumption that a fact exists, based on the known or proven 
existence of some other fact or group of facts.”142 The basis for the 
presumption of irreparable harm in trademark law is the known or 
proven fact that monetary relief from trademark infringement is 
“inherently ‘inadequate’ and injury is ‘irreparable.’”143 Accordingly, 
the trademark presumption is merely an efficient, commonsense 
approach of recognizing the inherently irreparable nature of 
trademark infringement; it is not the type of categorical rule 
forbidden by eBay. Moreover, it is not the common practice of 
courts to automatically issue trademark injunctions based solely on a 
finding of irreparable harm after a plaintiff has demonstrated a 
likelihood of success on the merits.144 Instead, when employing the 
presumption of irreparable harm, courts must still weigh the other 
factors of the test. Thus, the presumption neither categorically 
prescribes irreparable harm nor is used to depart from traditional 
equitable practices.145  
At least one district court has made this distinction post-eBay. In 
Petro Franchise Systems, LLC v. All American Properties, Inc., a 
trademark infringement case, the court stated, “A conclusive 
determination that three equitable factors automatically follow when 
success on the merits is established is quite far from a mere 
presumption that a single factor—irreparable harm—should usually 
follow when likelihood of confusion is established.”146 In other 
words, the trademark presumption of irreparable harm is not the 
type of categorical rule that eBay forbids. Thus, as noted by Professor 
McCarthy, “The presumption is just that: it is not an iron-clad rule 
which inevitably leads to a preliminary injunction in all trademark 
infringement cases. The traditional equities must always be weighed 
and balanced.”147 Indeed, as one court noted, after distinguishing 
 
 141. Id. at 391 (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982)). 
 142. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1304 (9th ed. 2009). 
 143. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See Solar Cosmetics Labs, Inc. v. Sun-Fun Prods. Inc., 941 F. Supp. 1185, 1189 
(M.D. Fla. 1996) (“[I]t is clear that irreparable harm does not automatically follow from a 
substantial showing of likelihood of confusion.”).  
 146. 607 F. Supp. 2d 781, 794 (W.D. Tex. 2009). 
 147. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3. 
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the Federal Circuit’s categorical rule from the trademark 
presumption, “eBay does not discuss, much less eliminate the 
presumption of irreparable harm in this [trademark] context.”148  
Second, as argued by Professor McCarthy, even if irreparable 
harm is presumed based upon a likelihood of success on the merits, 
that presumption may still be rebutted.149 As the Second Circuit 
remarked, the presumption of irreparable injury “leaves the door 
slightly ajar perhaps for those few cases in other trademark contexts 
where irreparable harm does not follow.”150 As an illustration of this 
point, in SMJ Group, Inc. v. 417 Lafayette Restaurant LLC, 
restaurant owners sued a group of ex-employees for trademark 
infringement after they began handing out leaflets questioning 
restaurant patrons’ decision to eat at the restaurant.151 These leaflets 
bore the trademarked logo of one of the owners’ restaurants as well 
as the text: “Do you really want to eat here?”152 At the time, the 
restaurant and some of its ex-employees were engaged in a lawsuit 
over the alleged misappropriation of tips and unpaid overtime hours 
worked.153 In this case involving initial interest confusion, the court 
held that although the trademark owners were likely to succeed in 
showing a likelihood of confusion, irreparable harm could not be 
established because any harm to the owners as a result of the logo-
bearing flyers came from the ex-employees’ message, not their use of 
the owners’ mark.154 Accordingly, because potential restaurant 
patrons were not diverted by the logo to a substitute restaurant, the 
ex-employees’ use of the mark did not frustrate individuals’ attempts 
to eat at the restaurant. Thus, the restaurant owners were not 
irreparably harmed by the infringing use, and the court denied their 
motion for a preliminary injunction.155 
Furthermore, courts may deny injunctive relief even if the 
presumption of irreparable harm is applied and not rebutted. As 
McCarthy has noted, “Because the grant of a preliminary injunction 
 
 148. Irwin Indus. Tool Co., v. Worthington Cylinders Wis., LLC, Civil No. 3:08cv291, 
2010 WL 3895698, at *27 n.4 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 2010). 
 149. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3. 
 150. Church of Scientology Int'l v. Elmira Mission of the Church of Scientology, 794 
F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 151. 439 F. Supp. 2d 281, 285–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 152. Id. at 285. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 295. 
 155. Id.  
DO NOT DELETE 5/3/2011 1:41 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
558 
is in the exercise of a traditional equitable remedy, even if the 
trademark owner proves a likelihood of success in proving a 
likelihood of confusion, there may be other equities which dictate 
denial of a preliminary injunction.”156 For example, in Citibank, 
N.A. v. Citytrust, the Second Circuit vacated a preliminary 
injunction after it found that differences in the marks, and a 
significant delay in seeking an injunction, offset the balance of the 
equities in the injunction inquiry.157 This neutralization158 of the 
presumption has been recognized by other courts and is another 
example of the non-categorical nature of the trademark 
presumption.159 Thus, as noted by one court, “[I]t is clear that 
irreparable harm does not automatically follow from a substantial 
showing of likelihood of confusion.”160  
These cases demonstrate that categorically granting patent 
injunctions upon findings of validity and infringement is very 
different from presuming the existence of one factor in the 
injunction test. One approach leaves no place for equitable 
considerations and the other does. Indeed, to borrow from the 
Second Circuit’s analogy, while the presumption of irreparable harm 
“leaves the door slightly ajar,”161 the Federal Circuit’s categorical 
rule closes and double bolts the door. 
Third, eBay was largely “about the nature of patent rights in the 
era of patent trolling.”162 This is evidenced by the dueling 
concurrences written by Chief Justice Roberts, who favored the 
tradition of issuing injunctions upon a finding of infringement,163 
and Justice Kennedy, who argued that the recent increase in patent 
troll activity demonstrates the need to reemphasize the requirement 
 
 156. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 30:47. 
 157. 756 F.2d 273, 277 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 158. See id. at 276. 
 159. See GTE Corp. v. Williams, 731 F.2d 676, 678 (10th Cir. 1984); Desknet Sys., Inc. 
v. Desknet, Inc., 96 CIV. 9548(JSM), 1997 WL 253246 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 1997); Del-Rain 
Corp. v. Pelonis USA Ltd., 94-CV-587S, 1995 WL 116043 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1995); Chase 
Manhattan Corp. v. Northwestern Mutual Life, 92 Civ. 4978(CBM), 1993 WL 60602 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1993). 
 160. Solar Cosmetics Labs, Inc. v. Sun-Fun Prods., Inc., 941 F. Supp. 1185, 1189 (M.D. 
Fla. 1996). 
 161. See Church of Scientology Int'l v. Elmira Mission of the Church of Scientology, 794 
F.2d 38, 42 (2d. Cir. 1986). 
 162. See Bernstein & Gilden, supra note 11, at 1043.  
 163. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394–95 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring). 
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to balance the property rights of patent owners with the public 
interest served by the patent system.164 Prior to eBay, courts had 
been automatically issuing permanent injunctions upon a finding of a 
validity and infringement. This practice was problematic because 
these non-practicing entities, or patent trolls, never intended to 
practice their patents. In fact, the business model of patent trolls is 
largely based on procuring patents merely to sue for their 
infringement. Accordingly, enjoining another party from practicing 
those patents does not comport with the policy justification for the 
U.S. patent system, which is to incentivize innovation in exchange 
for a temporary monopoly on a technology. The eBay case was 
decided amidst the growing concern over patent trolling, and this 
concern seems to be the true dispute underlying the case.165 The fact 
that eBay was as much about the nature of patent rights as the nature 
of equitable relief should inform courts in their application of the 
case to trademark law, where concerns over patent trolling are not 
present. Such an informed application favors not over-reading eBay 
to the extent of eliminating the trademark presumption of 
irreparable harm. 
Finally, principles of patent and copyright law cannot be applied 
wholesale in the trademark context. As discussed above, the Court in 
eBay looked to principles of copyright law in deciding a case about 
patent injunctions.166 In fact, the Court explicitly compared the 
exclusionary rights of patent and copyright owners and cited to 
copyright cases in setting forth requirements for patent 
injunctions.167 Although patents, copyrights, and trademarks are all 
forms of intellectual property, the nature of trademark protection 
differs significantly from that of patents and copyrights.168 Patent and 
copyright law offers constitutionally based protections, affording 
owners an exclusionary right for a finite period of time. Trademark 
law, on the other hand, is a statutory invention that allows for a 
potentially indefinite duration of protection. Therefore, the decision 
of whether to issue a patent injunction implicates a more limited 
duration of rights than does a decision regarding trademark 
injunctions and should be treated differently. Also, as stated in the 
 
 164. Id. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 165. Bernstein & Gilden, supra note 11, at 1043. 
 166. eBay, 547 U.S. at 392–93 (majority opinion). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 6:8. 
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Constitution, patents and copyrights are protected by the 
government, “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”169 In other 
words, patents and copyrights are issued to incentivize innovation 
and creativity. Trademark law does not primarily seek such 
incentives. Instead, trademark law seeks both to protect a trademark 
owner’s acquired goodwill and to guard against consumer 
confusion.170 An understanding of these differences should inform 
courts in cases involving intellectual property. As one court has 
stated, “Copyright, patent and trademark laws stem from different 
concepts and offer different kinds of protection.”171 Accordingly, 
issuing a patent or copyright injunction implicates an entirely 
different set of rights and policy underpinnings than does issuing a 
trademark injunction.172 Thus, courts should avoid a wholesale 
application of eBay’s holding to trademark injunction cases and 
should continue to presume irreparable injury upon a showing of a 
likelihood of success on the merits.  
Furthermore, the trademark presumption’s survival is supported 
by the continuing application of presumptions of irreparable harm in 
other contexts. For example, it is well settled that a plaintiff seeking 
an injunction for “‘the loss of First Amendment freedoms for even 
minimal periods of time,’ is presumed to constitute irreparable 
harm.”173 Likewise, presumptions of irreparable harm have been 
employed in claims made for violations of the Equal Access Act,174 
Communications Act (broadcasting without a license),175 Compe-
tition in Contracting Act,176 and Civil Rights Act (Title VII employ-
 
 169. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 170.  See MCCARTHY, supra note 3,  § 2:2. 
 171. Application of Penthouse Int’l Ltd., 565 F.2d 679, 683 n.3, 195 U.S.P.Q. 698 
(C.C.P.A. 1977). 
 172. See Bernstein & Gilden, supra note 11, at 1058. 
 173. Brogdon v. Lafion, 217 F. App’x 518, 522 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 
427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)); see also Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1002 (9th Cir. 
2005); Pacific Frontier v. Pleasant Grove City, 414 F.3d 1221, 1235 (10th Cir. 2005); Bronx 
Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 331 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 174. See Straights and Gays for Equality v. Osseo Area Sch.-Dist. No. 279, 471 F.3d 908, 
913 (8th Cir. 2006); Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1149 (C.D. 
Cal. 2000). 
 175. See Free Speech ex rel. Ruggiero v. Reno, 200 F.3d 63, 65 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 176. CW Gov’t Travel, Inc. v. United States, 163 F. App’x 853, 860 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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ment discrimination).177 This is because these types of violations are, 
like trademark infringement, inherently irreparable. Certainly the 
eBay Court did not intend to do away with presumptions of 
irreparable harm in each of these contexts. Nor should the eBay 
decision be read in this way. Employing presumptions of irreparable 
harm in the injunction inquiry is a common and well-engrained 
practice for U.S. courts. This practice should not be abandoned 
without clear direction from Congress or the Supreme Court.  
In sum, unlike the Federal Circuit rule struck down by the Court 
in eBay, the presumption of irreparable harm is not a categorical rule 
that circumvents the weighing of traditional equitable principles. It is 
merely a tool that courts may employ in weighing equitable 
considerations and that may be rebutted upon sufficient evidence. 
Accordingly, courts should not transplant patent law into a 
trademark inquiry by reading the policy-driven eBay decision as 
eliminating the presumption of irreparable harm in trademark law. 
B. Winter Did Not Kill the Presumption of Irreparable Harm in 
Trademark Cases 
As is the case with eBay, Winter should not be read to eliminate 
the presumption of irreparable harm in trademark cases. As detailed 
above, the Supreme Court in Winter rejected the Ninth Circuit’s 
practice of issuing a preliminary injunction based on the mere 
possibility of irreparable harm in favor of a stricter standard. This 
subsection argues that Winter’s requirement that plaintiffs seeking 
preliminary relief must demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in 
the absence of an injunction can coexist with the trademark 
presumption of irreparable harm.  
First, the rejected “possibility” standard is not equivalent to the 
presumption of irreparable harm as applied in trademark cases. 
Granted, the two concepts are related. Both reduce a plaintiff’s 
 
 177. See United States v. Hayes Int’l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038, 1045 (5th Cir. 1969) 
(“Where . . . the statutory rights of employees are involved and an injunction is authorized by 
statute and the statutory conditions are satisfied . . . the usual prerequisite of irreparable injury 
need not be established and the agency to whom the enforcement of the right has been 
entrusted is not required to show irreparable injury before obtaining an injunction. We take 
the position that in such a case, irreparable injury should be presumed from the very fact that 
the statute has been violated. Whenever a qualified . . . employee is discriminatorily denied a 
chance to fill a position for which he is qualified and has the seniority to obtain, he suffers 
irreparable injury and so does the labor force of the country as a whole.”) (citations omitted); 
see also Middleton-Keirn v. Stone, 655 F.2d 609, 611 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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burden in seeking an injunction. However, the concepts are 
fundamentally different. The “possibility” standard requires a 
relatively low probability of irreparable harm. Such a standard 
practically assures a successful showing by a plaintiff and trivializes a 
key equitable consideration in the injunction inquiry. This idea is 
inconsistent with the Court’s “characterization of injunctive relief as 
an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear 
showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”178  
In contrast, a presumption of irreparable harm does not assure a 
successful showing of irreparable harm because the presumption can 
be rebutted. Nor does a presumption of irreparable harm require a 
lesser probability that such harm will occur absent an injunction. The 
Winter Court’s qualms were not with presumptions of irreparable 
harm. Indeed, the Court did not address presumptions at all. The 
Court was concerned with the idea that preliminary injunctions were 
issuing “simply to prevent the possibility of some remote future 
injury.”179 Such speculative injury is not a concern with trademark 
infringement. The very reason for the existence of the trademark 
presumption of irreparable harm is that irreparable harm is inherently 
likely following trademark infringement.180 Accordingly, when a 
court presumes irreparable harm in a trademark case, it is presuming 
that irreparable harm is at least “likely” and not merely “possible.” 
Thus, the trademark presumption of irreparable harm is permissible 
under Winter’s stricter “likely” standard. Such a conclusion might 
explain why so many courts continue to employ the presumption 
post-Winter.181 As noted above, various courts have cited to Winter’s 
preliminary injunction standard before going on to presume 
irreparable harm.182 One such court explicitly held that courts may 
continue to presume irreparable injury “because trademark damages 
are by their very nature irreparable.”183  
Second, Winter involved the potential harm caused by the 
Navy’s use of MFA sonar on marine mammals. It in no way dealt 
 
 178. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 375–76 (2008). 
 179. Id. at 375 (quoting 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2948.1 (2d ed. 1995)). 
 180. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3. 
 181. See supra notes 103–14 and accompanying text.  
 182. Id. 
 183. See Garcoa, Inc. v. PH Beauty Labs., Inc., No. CV 09-4859 AHM (Ex), 2009 WL 
2489223, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2009). 
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with trademark issues or even intellectual property generally. Neither 
did Winter address the validity of presumptions of irreparable harm. 
Because Winter does not address these issues, either explicitly or 
implicitly, courts should hesitate to extend its holding to eliminate 
the trademark presumption. 
Third, as one commentator has recently suggested, Winter may 
be distinguishable from trademark cases in the context of the public 
interest factor of the preliminary injunction test.184 The Navy’s use of 
MFA sonar in Winter was, as determined by the President, “essential 
to national security,” and enjoining its use would “undermine the 
Navy’s ability to conduct realistic training exercises that are necessary 
to ensure the combat effectiveness of . . . strike groups.”185 Thus, the 
public interest inquiry weighed heavily against enjoining the Navy’s 
use of MFA sonar. No such public interest disfavors preliminarily 
enjoining the use of another’s valid trademark. Indeed, the public 
interest in avoiding consumer confusion and protecting acquired 
goodwill favors preliminary trademark injunctions and presuming 
irreparable harm upon a likelihood of success on the merits. 
C. The Harm Caused by Trademark Infringement Is Inherently 
Irreparable 
Finally, as argued by Professor McCarthy, the nature of 
trademark infringement further distinguishes trademark cases from 
cases like eBay and Winter.186 While patent infringement and MFA 
sonar use do not by their nature cause irreparable harm, “once the 
likelihood of confusion caused by trademark infringement has been 
established, the inescapable conclusion is that there was also 
irreparable injury.”187 Such damage to business “reputation and 
goodwill is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify in terms of 
dollars.”188 As the Second Circuit has stated: 
Where there is, then, such high probability of confusion, injury 
irreparable in the sense that it may not be fully compensable in 
damages almost inevitably follows. While an injured plaintiff would 
 
 184. Williams, supra note 9, at 575. 
 185. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 373 (2008) 
(citation omitted). 
 186. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3. 
 187. Pappan Enters. v. Hardee's Food Sys., 143 F.3d 800, 805 (3d Cir. 1998).  
 188. Medicine Shoppe Int'l, Inc. v. S.B.S. Pill Dr., Inc., 336 F.3d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 
2003). 
DO NOT DELETE 5/3/2011 1:41 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
564 
be entitled to recover the profits on the infringing items, this is 
often difficult to determine; moreover, a defendant may have failed 
to earn profits because of the poor quality of its product or its own 
inefficiency. Indeed, confusion may cause purchasers to refrain 
from buying either product and to turn to those of other 
competitors. Yet to prove the loss of sales due to infringement is 
also notoriously difficult. Furthermore, if an infringer’s product is 
of poor quality, or simply not worth the price, a more lasting but 
not readily measurable injury may be inflicted on the plaintiff’s 
reputation in the market.189 
Thus, attempting to use after-the-fact monetary awards to 
compensate for damage to business goodwill and reputation is 
“[l]ike trying to un-ring a bell” and cannot constitute fair or full 
compensation.190 “Such harm, coupled with the difficulty of 
monetizing lost goodwill and reputation, creates irreparable injury 
sufficient for a preliminary injunction.”191 
This inherently irreparable nature of trademark infringement is 
the primary reason that courts created the trademark presumption of 
irreparable harm in the first place.192 This unique aspect of trademark 
infringement has not changed and should be strongly considered 
when determining the reach of eBay and Winter into trademark law. 
This Note references several cases involving the trademark 
presumption of irreparable harm. Importantly, regardless of whether 
those courts rejected, recognized, or side-stepped the presumption, 
irreparable harm has almost invariably been found following a 
finding of a likelihood of infringement. This evidences the 
practicality of the presumption and demonstrates that even if the 
presumption were to be formally discarded, the essence of the 
presumption would continue to manifest itself in trademark 
infringement cases. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although the Supreme Court’s decisions in eBay and Winter 
have caused some courts to question the continuing validity of the 
 
 189. Omega Importing Corp. v. Petri-Kine Camera Co., 451 F.2d 1190, 1195 (2d Cir. 
1971) (citations omitted). 
 190. McCarthy, supra note 1, at 4–5. 
 191. Id. at 5 n.14. 
 192. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3. 
 
DO NOT DELETE 5/3/2011 1:41 PM 
535 The Irreparably Harmed Presumption? 
 565 
trademark presumption of irreparable harm, these cases should not 
be read to have eliminated the presumption. Both eBay and Winter 
are capable of coexisting with the presumption as these cases 
addressed neither trademarks nor presumptions. The presumption 
does not conflict with eBay’s requirement that the traditional four 
equitable factors be weighed in the decision of whether to issue an 
injunction; nor does it equate with the “categorical” rule rejected by 
the Court in that case. Likewise, the presumption does not violate 
Winter’s requirement that irreparable harm be likely absent 
injunctive relief. Finally, the inherently irreparable nature of 
trademark infringement distinguishes eBay and Winter from 
trademark infringement cases and continues to justify the 
presumption’s validity. 
Jeffrey M. Sanchez 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   J.D. candidate, April 2011, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University. Many thanks to Justice Thomas R. Lee for his thoughtful feedback and careful 
contribution to this work. I also want to express appreciation to Margaret Niver McGann for 
introducing me to this fascinating area of trademark law and to John E. Delaney for fostering 
the idea of this work while in its incipiency. Most importantly, I want to thank my wife, 
Kristin, whose love, friendship, and undying support inspire and give meaning to all that I do. 
DO NOT DELETE 5/3/2011 1:41 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
566 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
